

Anti-Semites on Zionism: From Indifference to Obsession

Derek J. Penslar

This article compares European and Middle Eastern anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From the 1870s through the 1930s, in parallel fashion anti-Semitism became a mobilizing, all-embracing ideology in Europe, while the Arab world witnessed an eruption of anticolonial and nationalist sentiment, often directed against the Zionist project. Arab anti-Semitism featured the irrational and fantastic qualities of its European counterpart, but it took form against the reality of the Zionist project. The article draws a distinction between the realms of systemic intolerance, aggravated by socio-economic crisis, and political strife, driven by discrete events and policies. Its main sources are fin-de-siècle European anti-Semites' writings on Zionism, which are shown to be fundamentally different from the anti-Zionist rhetoric emanating from the Middle East at that time.

In his classic Zionist manifesto *The Jewish State* (1896), Theodor Herzl claimed that the “Jewish Question” was “neither a social nor religious one, even if it at times takes on these or other colorings. It is a national question, and in order to solve it, we must make it into an international political question, which will be managed through counsel with the civilized nations of the globe.”¹ Herzl believed that the anti-Semitism of his day contained certain elements of what he called “legitimate self-defense,” for emancipated Jews were particularly well-suited for commerce and the professions, thus creating “fierce competition” with bourgeois Gentiles. Economic issues, however, were, in Herzl’s view, epiphenomenal, for no matter how Jews earned their livelihood, no matter how greatly they contributed to the wealth and welfare of the lands in which they lived,

Derek J. Penslar is the Samuel Zacks Professor of History and Director of the Jewish Studies Program at the University of Toronto. Correspondence to: Derek J. Penslar, Jewish Studies Program, University of Toronto, University College 322, 15 King’s College Circle, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7, Canada. Email: derek.penslar@utoronto.ca

they were decried as strangers and parasites. Thus for Herzl, as for millions of Jews from his time to our own, Zionism has appeared to be a rational response to an irrational and ineradicable form of prejudice.

Herzl believed that anti-Semites themselves would appreciate the desirability and feasibility of the Zionist project and would gladly help ensure a smooth transfer of unwanted Jews from Europe to Palestine. In fact, however, most anti-Semitic ideologues in *fin-de-siècle* Europe were indifferent to or dismissive of Zionism. Believing that Jews were incorrigibly dishonorable and work-shy, anti-Semites considered Zionism to be at best an impracticable fantasy, as Jews would not willingly leave the fleshpots of the West to take on the arduous task of rebuilding their ancient Oriental homeland. At worst, Zionism was thought to represent yet another tentacle in the vast Jewish conspiracy to extend financial and political control over the entire globe. Over the period 1880–1940, as anti-Semitism became a mobilizing, all-embracing ideology in much of Europe, the latter view gained prominence, although the process was gradual, uneven, and specific to certain countries.

Over the same period, the Arab world witnessed an eruption of anti-colonial and nationalist sentiment, often directed against the Zionist project. Whereas Zionism was peripheral to European anti-Semitism, it was central to Arab sensibilities about Judaism and Jews. In both environments anti-Semitism was a response to apparently inexplicable upheavals and an expression of virulent *ressentiment*, yet the function of Zionism in anti-Semitic discourse in Europe, compared to that in the Middle East, suggests the need to draw a distinction between systemic intolerance, aggravated by socio-economic crisis, and political strife, driven by discrete events and policies. To employ a medical metaphor—quite appropriate, since all forms of anti-Semitism are pathological—European anti-Semitism may be compared to a psychosomatic illness, whereas its Arab counterpart more closely resembles a toxic allergic reaction. The former originated in fantasy yet crippled the entire body politic; the latter has been a debilitating, even fatal, response to a genuine substance.

Whereas most of the literature on the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism focuses on contemporary developments, there is much to be gained through a historical approach, through grasping underlying assumptions and visceral feelings about Zionism when they were first expressed, before they were affected by contingencies and rapidly changing events on the ground. Historical developments could either mitigate or intensify anti-Jewish feeling. An example of the former would be the temporary alliance between Zionism and Nazism in the guise of the Transfer (*Ha'avarah*) Agreement of the 1930s, which facilitated German-Jewish emigration to Palestine. The power of events to deepen anti-Semitic grooves is demonstrated in the Arab world, where Israel's military victories in 1948, 1956 and 1967 generated a tidal wave of anger and compelled a search for explanations for the Arabs' ignominious defeat in the arcane realms of anti-Semitic fantasy. In the early 1900s, however, and particularly after the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the rapid growth of the Jewish National Home thereafter, Zionism was a sufficiently powerful presence on the international scene and within Palestine itself to command attention

without being so influential that it had to be accorded de facto acceptance or utterly demonized.

This article focuses primarily on Europe, and it does so for two reasons: I have some expertise in the area; and despite the vast literature on the history of European anti-Semitism, its conceptual stance vis-à-vis Zionism has, surprisingly, not been properly elucidated. The discussion of Arab anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism is briefer and more synthetic, but it is placed within a comparative analytical framework whose novel features will, I hope, stimulate experts in the modern Middle East to further, fuller reflection on the subject.

Zionism in European Anti-Semitic Discourse

Classic, nineteenth-century anti-Semitism identified the Jew with modern capitalism and the rapid transformation of society and culture that came in its wake. Ancient and medieval tropes of Jewish avarice, murderous hatred of Gentiles, and black-magical practices mutated into the modern stereotype of an international Jewish conspiracy. Tellingly, the myth of a global Jewish financial cabal flourished among early socialist thinkers in France and Germany during the 1840s, a decade of economic turmoil due in part to the impact of industrialization on the peasants and artisans who constituted the bulk of the population. The metonymic association between Jew and capitalism, and by extension with modernity as such, was a driving force behind late-nineteenth-century political anti-Semitism, described appositely by the German socialist leader August Bebel as “the socialism of the stupid man.”

Intriguingly, the discourse on Jewish restoration to Palestine, a discourse that intensified with the writings of the former socialist Moses Hess in the 1860s and, of course, with the establishment of the Zionist movement in the 1880s, attracted little sustained attention from anti-Semitic ideologues. To be sure, one can find scattered statements in writings on the “Jewish Question,” dating back to the Enlightenment, about shipping Jews out of Europe and back to Palestine. Scholars have painstakingly accumulated such statements by the likes of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Heinrich von Treitschke and Adolph Stöcker, among others, but they have failed to note that these utterances were merely barbed quips or enraged outbursts, and rarely led to a sustained engagement with Zionism even after Theodor Herzl brought it onto the stage of public opinion.

One apparent exception was the Hungarian anti-Semitic activist Győző Istóczy, who is the subject of a recent biography by Andrew Handler, provocatively titled *An Early Blueprint for Zionism*. Handler draws the title from a speech of 1878 on “The Restoration of the Jewish State in Palestine,” delivered by Istóczy from the floor of the Hungarian Diet, of which he was an elected member. Reflecting an anti-Russian and pro-Turkish sentiment as much as an anti-Semitic worldview, Istóczy claimed that such a state would revive “the enfeebled and backward East” by introducing Jewish wealth and energy, “a vigorous, powerful and new element and an influential ingredient of civilization.”² Istóczy offered few specifics as to how this plan would be implemented, and subsequent

to the speech Istóczy soon let the matter drop, as it encountered strong disapproval from his fellow parliamentarians. Thus this “early blueprint” for Zionism was, in fact, quite sketchy and faded quickly. For the next twenty years, Istóczy pursued the usual anti-Semitic agenda of attacking alleged Jewish domination in finance, commerce and journalism within Europe. It is true that in 1906 he began to speak in support of the now-established political Zionist movement, but by 1911 he had lost interest, largely due to the Young Turk government’s opposition to massive Jewish immigration to Palestine.³

By and large, anti-Semitic ideologues of the *fin de siècle* paid Zionism little heed, and when they did think about it, dismissed it as a trick, perpetrated by the agents of the international Jewish conspiracy. In the French journalist Edouard Drumont, perhaps the most successful anti-Semitic scribbler of the period, we have the interesting case of an anti-Semite whose interest in Zionism waxed and waned, fading away altogether when Drumont decided that Zionism did not stand a chance against its rivals, assimilationist and plutocratic Jews, who also happened to be, in Drumont’s view, the greatest threats to the world as a whole.

Drumont’s daily newspaper, *La Libre Parole*, greeted the First Zionist Congress of 1897 with great fanfare. Apparently confirming Herzl’s views that anti-Semites and Zionists would find a meeting of minds and form a productive collaboration, the newspaper wrote, in its customary sneering tone, “Not only does [*La Libre Parole*] offer, freely and enthusiastically, publicity for the [Zionist] colonists, but if it were ever—an inconceivable thing—a question of money that caused the Jews to hesitate, it takes upon itself the commitment to take up a subscription whose immense success is not in doubt.”⁴ Yet right from the start Drumont saw a snake in the Zionist garden, Jewish “haute-banque,” that cabal of powerful Jewish financiers whose economic interests depended on the maintenance of a vast global Jewish network and would thus be harmed by the mass movement of Jews to Palestine.⁵

A decade later, as the Zionist movement appeared to shake off the lethargy that had gripped the movement since Herzl’s death in 1904, Drumont devoted considerable energy to drumming up anti-Semitic support for Zionism. At the time of the Eighth Congress in 1907, Drumont wrote that Zionism represented the “future of the Jewish Question and, consequently, the future of humanity as a whole.” Were the Jews removed from Europe to Palestine, “this Jewish Question, which . . . dominates all human affairs, including the Social Question, would be resolved, at least for the time being, and the world would finally know a period of calm and relative security.” Drumont even expressed admiration for Zionists, whom he contrasted unfavorably with their opponents:

The Jew who aspires to reconstitute a homeland is worthy of esteem. The Jew who destroys the homeland of others is worthy of every kind of scorn. The Jew who wants to have a flag and a religion is a virtuous Jew, and we will never proffer against him any hurtful word . . . We have therefore all sorts of reasons to prefer the Zionist Jews over those arrogant Hebrews who aspire not only to involve themselves in our affairs but also to impose their ideas and their will upon us, who treat us in our own homeland as representatives of an inferior race, as vanquished and pariahs.⁶

Drumont and his contributing journalists consistently praised Herzl, and especially Max Nordau, for his fiery and unapologetic Jewish nationalism, while they pilloried the principled assimilationism of French-Jewish notables such as Joseph Reinach and Emile Cahen, editor of *Les Archives Israélites*.

By 1913, however, Drumont had changed his tune. On the eve of the Eleventh Zionist Congress, Drumont warned darkly that “this conference will probably be the last, and this racket will have sounded Zionism’s death-knell.”⁷ Reproducing verbatim large sections from his 1907 articles on the subject, Drumont added a new twist: The “great Jews” Herzl and Nordau have been vanquished by the combined forces of assimilationists and Jewish high finance. Drumont accused the former of shifting the Zionist Organization’s focus away from international diplomacy, aimed at obtaining a Jewish homeland secured by public law, and enmeshing the movement in *Gegenwartsarbeit*, political and cultural activity in the diaspora. Even worse, according to Drumont, was the work of “the great Jews, the aristocrats of banking,” who, like Maurice de Hirsch, had always been hostile to Zionism, and who had now created Territorialism:

It is no longer a matter of reconstituting in Palestine or elsewhere a Jewish nation having its land, its flag and its religion, but only of creating Jewish colonies for the use of poor and miserable Jews who would go establish themselves in distant territories. During this time, the ambitious Jews, having pushed from view their shabby brethren, would enjoy, more than ever, the unquestioned authority and enormous power that they wield in the country where, as in France, they have become the masters and the rulers.

It matters little that Drumont was wrong on both points—both *Gegenwartsarbeit* and Territorialism developed from within the heart of the Zionist movement—rather, the key here is that Drumont placed the contest between Zionism and its enemies within sturdy and venerable anti-Semitic frameworks of conspiracy led by Jewish plutocrats and cultural domination by assimilated Jewish intellectuals. Drumont’s views on Zionism were not influenced by, nor did they influence, his general anti-Semitic worldview. Drumont was willing to endorse Zionism if it appeared to confirm his preexisting views that Jewish nationhood was ineradicable, but in the blink of an eye he was quite willing to disown it, especially since, on the eve of and during World War I, Zionist goals increasingly appeared to conflict with French imperial interests and the sensibilities of Roman Catholics in the Middle East.⁸

As we expand our chronological horizon into the twentieth century, it appears that in France, Zionism, although occasionally applauded or derided, was peripheral to the anti-Semitic imagination. Adulatory literature written in France about Drumont in the decades following his death—literature that includes generous extracts from his work—does not make so much as a mention of Zionism. Such writing does, however, faithfully reproduce Drumont’s own *idées fixes* about Jewish responsibility for the corruption, social upheaval and financial scandals that were making life hell for the little man.⁹ More important, during France’s darkest and most shameful hours in the Second World War, the Vichy regime devoted little time and effort to the issue of

Zionism, and when the matter did come up, attitudes were instrumental, based on the needs of the moment. In 1943, when a German victory no longer seemed assured and the mass deportations of Jews were provoking considerable discontent in France, the Vichy regime toyed with pro-Zionist proposals to facilitate mass Jewish emigration to Palestine and endorse the creation of a Jewish state. Unlike the Nazis, who had come out clearly against Jewish statehood at the time of the Partition Controversy of 1937 and put an end to Jewish emigration to Palestine in 1940 as part of the transition from a policy of mass expulsion to one of genocide, Vichy leaders, admittedly steeped in anti-Semitic yearnings to rid France of the Jews, were willing to ponder what the chief of Marshal Pétain's civilian staff called "the only truly effectual solution [to the Jewish Question] that is both completely humane and Christian."¹⁰

Similarly, Italian fascism adopted an instrumental approach to Zionism, opposing it when it clashed with Catholic interests or appeared to be a tool of British expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean, and embracing it when it was thought that Zionists might sever their alliance with Britain and turn to Italy as their protector. This flexibility reflected the ambiguous legacy of Italian anti-Semitism in the post-unification era. On the one hand, Italian Catholicism could espouse no less fierce an anti-Semitism than its French counterpart, as seen in the stridently Judeophobic Vatican periodical *La Civiltà Cattolica*, which argued that the Jewish religion was corrupt, materialistic and long superseded by Christianity, and that the Jews comprised:

an ambiguous nation, because, at the same time, it [the Jewish community] is the same and the Other, as the other nations of the world where they have settled: [they are] Jewish Italians, French, Germans, English, Americans, Rumanians, and Poles, that is to say, the Jews enjoy dual nationality. It seems that they carry 'a harvest of' advantages to the country where they sit, and that the country will reap these advantages, their financial skills and intelligence. But these advantages are, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, used methodically to get the upper hand and secure power for the Jewish nation, controlling high finance so that more or less veiled, they will control everybody.¹¹

Nonetheless, due to the relative strength of the secular Italian state vis-à-vis the vanquished Church, anti-Semitism did not become a political force in the early twentieth century. The Italian kingdom, with its Jewish cabinet ministers, mayors and prime minister, was a country with many Dreyfuses, yet no Dreyfus Affair.

Ironically, the relative weakness of political anti-Semitism in early-twentieth-century Italy made possible a more serious and pragmatic engagement with Zionism than was the case in France, where Zionism's political program was engulfed by the anti-Semitic fog generated by the Dreyfus Affair. Accordingly, during the early years of Mussolini's rule, there were numerous meetings between Mussolini and the leaders of Italian and international Zionism, and although in the late 1920s Mussolini unhesitatingly turned against Zionism in order to satisfy the interests of the Vatican, with which he negotiated a Concordat in 1929, in the early 1930s Mussolini once again announced a favorable stance towards Zionism, inviting the World Zionist

Organization to convene in Italy and hoping (rather improbably) that pro-Italian Jewish immigrants to Palestine could gain sufficient influence to overturn the British Mandate.¹²

In Germany, by contrast, from the 1870s onward anti-Semites were wont to judge Zionism more harshly, as a manifestation of ongoing global Jewish chicanery. Wilhelm Marr, who is credited with coining the term “anti-semitism” in the late 1870s, wrote here and there throughout the 1880s about shipping all of Europe’s Jews to Palestine, where they could put their boundless energy and resources to work in creating a model polity, a *Musterstaat*. Yet this relatively sanguine attitude did not survive the passage of time, as Marr’s anti-Semitic worldview grew ever darker and more bitter. Marr wrote at the time of the First Zionist Congress of 1897 that “the entire matter is a foul Jewish swindle, in order to divert the attention of the European peoples from the Jewish problem.”¹³ Marr did not elaborate on his opposition to Zionism, for, as with Drumont and the other anti-Semites we have analyzed thus far, Zionism was far from central to Marr’s concerns.

The logical connection between conspiratorial anti-Semitism and an adamant rejection of Zionism may be found in the work of Marr’s contemporary, Eugen Dühring, author of what was perhaps the most relentlessly brutal anti-Semitic tract of the late nineteenth century, *The Jewish Question as a Question of Racial Noxiousness for the Existence, Morals and Culture of Nations* (1881). This book, which went through six editions up to 1930, offers an opportunity to observe how an acutely intelligent but deranged individual responded to Zionism as the movement gained prominence from the 1880s through the end of the First World War. We see that it was precisely the depth of Dühring’s anti-Semitism that prevented him from taking Zionism seriously and considering it outside of the prepackaged framework of a Jewish financial and cultural stranglehold over all of Europe. In the 1892 edition, Dühring devotes over seventy pages to elaborately detailed “solutions” to the Jewish Problem—solutions including reducing the numbers of Jews in, or barring them altogether from, the civil service, professions, journalism and teaching, and laying punitive taxes on Jewish-owned banks and other enterprises. In short, Dühring advocates the de-emancipation of European Jewry. Claiming that the Jews are racially incorrigible, Dühring dismisses Zionism in a couple of paragraphs, beginning with the following observation:

Moreover I do not believe that the Jews, if they were to really unite in a territory, be it a Jewish colony in Palestine or some other settlement, would be prevented from renewing their obtrusive nomadism. Nomadism is their world-historical natural condition. Without it and alone among themselves they would eat one another alive, for other peoples would not be among them. Such a thing as a Jewish state would mean the destruction of the Jews by the Jews.¹⁴

Thus, Dühring goes on to argue, Jews would always prefer living under the most oppressive conditions among Gentiles rather than among their own kind.

As Dühring aged, his language grew ever more bilious and threatening. In the posthumously published 1930 edition of the work, incorporating changes and

additions made by the author ten years before, Dühring claimed that throughout history no political force had been able to contain the Jewish menace. The Roman conquest of Palestine merely spread the Jewish disease into the diaspora, expulsion decrees in medieval Europe were ineffective, and ghettoization served only to strengthen Jewish solidarity. In turn, today's Zionists sought to dupe honest Europeans, who would like to see the Jews leave for Palestine, by selling them shares in various Zionist enterprises, all designed to enrich their Jewish directors. Moreover, a Jewish state, even if one were to be established, would only accentuate Jewish power; the Jewish snake that encircled the globe would now have a head:

This would entail pushing history back, thereby making necessary something like a second Roman clearing action. It would mean going back to the beginning, where the matter would be brought to an end in an entirely different and far more comprehensive sense. (*Es hiesse zum Anfang zurückzukehren, wo in einem ganz andern und weit durchgreifenderen Sinne ein Ende zu machen ist.*)¹⁵

A chilling, and prescient, threat indeed, yet one made in passing, via a few sentences, after which Dühring returns to his favorite themes of Jewish control over most aspects of politics, economics and culture in the Western world.

The significance of Dühring's text lies not only in what he says but also in the popularity and durability of his book, and the apparently paradoxical combination of a lack of serious interest in Zionism and a blanket condemnation of it. One encounters a similar case in the writings of Theodor Fritsch, whose *Antisemitism Catechism*, also published under the title *Handbook of the Jewish Problem*, went through thirty-six editions and a total print-run of 155,000 copies between 1886, when it first appeared, and 1934, a year after Fritsch's death.

Although the book was expanded considerably over time, its basic structure remained intact. First came an overview of the allegedly noxious role played by Jews throughout history from antiquity to the present, then a chapter of citations from contemporary Jewish writers attesting to the Jews' status as a separate nationality, followed by a chapter on the Jewish presence in malevolent secret societies. First and foremost among them were the Alliance Israélite Universelle (in fact, a philanthropic, educational and lobbying organization established in Paris in 1860) and the Russian *kahal*, an imaginary network of Russian-Jewish communities, as dreamed up by the Russian convert Iakov Brafman in a notorious book of 1868. The 1907 edition of Fritsch's book does not even mention Zionism in its chapter on Jewish secret societies, although the Anglo-Jewish Association (whose purview was similar to that of the Alliance) is singled out for condemnation, along with that venerable object of anti-Semitic fantasy, Freemasonry. In the chapter of statements by Jews claiming a unique national identity, most of the statements are from anti-Zionists, such as the Viennese Orthodox rabbi, Leopold Kohn, or individuals who were or may have been Zionists but are not identified as such (for example, the American rabbi, Berhardt Felsenthal). There is abundant, albeit wildly inaccurate, analysis of the

socio-economic situation and political life of the Jews in Germany's neighboring lands, but no treatment of the Zionist movement, its diplomatic activities, or events on the ground in Palestine.¹⁶

In the 1934 edition, the chapter on "Jewish Organizations and Parties" expanded to include material on a vast array of Jewish political bodies, and Zionism finally received its own subsection, but it only amounted to two pages out of more than five hundred in the book, and "Zionism" does not appear in the otherwise exhaustive index. Fritsch induces a frisson of fear as he details the evil deeds of the shadowy Russian-Jewish *kahal* or the omnipotent Alliance, "the central node for the realization of all Jewish special interests, implementing on any occasion the power of the whole of Jewry," and which has been responsible for everything from agitation on behalf of Captain Alfred Dreyfus to rallies for the condemned Italian-American anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. Zionism, on the other hand, is dismissed out of hand: Herzl and Nordau were frauds, lacking in imagination or ability; and the Zionist project would have been stillborn had it not been for wartime collusion between the British government and the Rothschilds, by which a promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine was made in return for international Jewish assistance to defeat Germany. Intriguingly, Fritsch does not credit the Zionists with the power and influence that one might expect from a virulent anti-Semite. Fritsch focuses instead on the British, who, he claims, have no intention of allowing a Jewish state to be set up in Palestine, as it would conflict with their imperial interests. Besides, Palestine is too small and its economy too undeveloped to accommodate large numbers of Jews, and the current Jewish community in Palestine is mostly urban, and hence no less corrupt and parasitical than its diaspora counterpart. The only good thing about Zionism, concludes Fritsch, is that it has "transformed previously in large measure inactive and apolitical Arabs into convinced opponents of the Jews."¹⁷

Like any anti-Semitic ideologue, Dühring and Fritsch had to simultaneously fabricate falsehood and deny reality. Not only did they demonize Zionist international diplomatic and fundraising activity, they also ignored the growth of the Jewish National Home, which was rooted in notions of Jewish bodily and cultural renewal. Like ultraviolet light, invisible to the naked eye, many aspects of the Zionist project simply could not be perceived within the optical field of anti-Semitism. One encounters precisely this sort of conceptual blindness in the somewhat more genteel, but no more palatable, tome by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899). In the midst of a massive (and highly negative) historical analysis of Judaism and Jews comes a remarkable observation that the Hebrew language died out four hundred years before Christ. (Apparently Chamberlain knew nothing about rabbinic literature.) Moreover:

Its adoption many centuries later was artificial and with the object of separating the Jews from their hosts in Europe . . . The absolute lack of feeling for language among the Jews today is explained by the fact that they are at home in no language—for a dead language cannot receive new life by command—and the Hebrew idiom is as much abused by them as any other.¹⁸

Thus when a Jew speaks Hebrew he does not speak Hebrew, just as a laboring Jew in a Palestinian vineyard does not truly labor. For these anti-Semites, Zionism is nothing but smoke and mirrors, and the only appropriate response is to conjure it away.

An association between Zionism and Jewish criminality became central to Nazi ideology, pioneered by Alfred Rosenberg, who claimed in 1922 that Zionism was an anti-German movement that drew support from reactionary capitalists (the Rothschilds) and Communists (“Jewish” Bolsheviks) alike. Drawing on Rosenberg and Dühring, Adolf Hitler, writing in *Mein Kampf*, would claim that Jews had no intention of constructing a legitimate state in Palestine, or ability to do so, but rather wished to make it into a clearing house for their international economic swindling operations. “[E]ndowed with sovereign rights and removed from the intervention of other states,” a Jewish state would become “a haven for convicted scoundrels and a university for budding crooks.”¹⁹ (Thus the intellectual pedigree of the notorious contemporary Holocaust denier Ernst Zundel’s characterization of Israel as “a gangster enclave in the Middle East.”)²⁰

Even in Nazi ideology, however, Zionism was little more than an addendum to a well-worn diatribe against international Jewish political machinations and inveterate malevolence. The presence of the Zionist movement did not substantively add to or detract from preexisting modes of anti-Semitic sensibility. The conceptual irrelevance of Zionism behind modern European anti-Semitism is demonstrated all the more clearly by the most significant text in the history of twentieth-century anti-Semitism, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

The precise authorship of the *Protocols* remains obscure, but scholars concur that the work was composed by agents of the Russian secret police in Paris during the 1890s. The *Protocols* were the most notorious expression of Jewish conspiracy theory, which originated among opponents of the Enlightenment and French Revolution. Specifically, the *Protocols* were inspired by Hermann Goedsche’s novel *Biarritz* (1868), a section of which depicts the assembly of a Jewish cabal at a Prague cemetery. Much of the *Protocols*’ text, however, was plagiarized from a second, wholly innocuous work, Maurice Joly’s *A Dialogue in Hell* (1864), which employed a fictional dialogue between the philosophers Machiavelli and Montesquieu in order to satirize the authoritarian rule of French Emperor Napoleon III. The authors of the *Protocols* lifted many of Machiavelli’s speeches verbatim and put them into the mouths of Jewish conspirators. Yet the authors of the *Protocols* transmuted Joly’s text while plagiarizing it, in that Joly presented Machiavelli as a cynical realist, whereas the *Protocols* depict the Jews as the embodiment of preternatural, all-consuming evil.²¹

Anti-Semitism in *fin-de-siècle* western and central Europe could be a form of lower-middle-class protest; in Germany and Austria, it took the form of “Christian Socialism” and nourished the populist demagoguery of Vienna’s mayor Karl Lueger. In Russia, on the other hand, anti-Semitism was often reactionary, a rejection of modernity in any form and a paean to rigid hierarchical rule by a hereditary nobility. These sentiments pervade the *Protocols*, which were written primarily in order to sabotage Russia’s halting moves towards economic modernization by associating

liberalization with Jewish conspiracy. The link between Russia, reaction and the *Protocols* was strengthened by their publication in St. Petersburg in 1903. The *Protocols* were disseminated throughout Russia by members of the ultra-rightist Black Hundreds, and Tsar Nicholas and Tsarina Alexandra commanded that Orthodox priests declaim the *Protocols* in the churches of Moscow.²²

In its early editions, a variety of origins were attributed to the *Protocols*, and only after the First World War do we see a popularization and routinization of the claim that they transcribe deliberations from the First Zionist Congress. The references to Herzl and the Congress come at the very beginning of the texts, and nothing in the text of the *Protocols* itself touches upon Zionism, although the *Protocols* were forged at the time of the beginnings of political Zionism in the late 1890s. Significantly, in editions of the *Protocols* issued before 1917, the international Jewish body referred to most often as generating the text is the Alliance. (A spectacular but anomalous exception was the work of the Russian reactionary Paquita de Shishmareff who, writing under the pseudonym L. Fry, claimed that the Zionist intellectual Ahad ha-Am had penned the *Protocols*.)²³ Just as the internationalist dimension of the Alliance's name and activities stoked the anti-Semitic imagination of the *fin de siècle*, so could the increased visibility of the Zionist movement in the wake of the Balfour Declaration and establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine encourage anti-Semites to interpret the Basel Congress as, citing Norman Cohn, "a giant stride towards Jewish world-domination."²⁴ But the actual Zionist program, enunciated at Basel in 1897 and legitimized in part by the British in 1917 and 1920, of creating a Jewish National Home in Palestine is overlooked in the interwar editions of the *Protocols*. Even the notorious paraphrase of the *Protocols* serialized in Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent* in 1920, which claims that the Sixth Zionist Congress predicted the outbreak of world war and that the Zionist movement represents the tip of an iceberg of international Jewish power, only engages issues relating to Jewish political activity in interwar Europe, specifically the minority-rights treaties, which allegedly singled Jews out for favorable treatment.²⁵

To sum up, Zionism did not exist as a discrete phenomenon in the minds of European anti-Semites during the half-century prior to the Holocaust. It was merely a placeholder for a host of conspiratorial fantasies that were rooted deep in the nineteenth century and in a search for an identifiable agent responsible for the bewildering social and political transformations sweeping Europe like a storm. Jews were of course only occasional representatives, rather than creators or agents, of these processes, as the anti-Semite's Jew was little more than a reflection and reification of European society itself. Granted, although European anti-Semitism was riddled with contradictions and highly irrational, it was not wholly illogical. It attributed to the Jew only selected attributes of the human psyche, such as arrogance, cupidity and a thirst for power. The anti-Semite's Jew was not stupid, brutish or enslaved to passion. Bridging the clashing stereotypes of the Jewish capitalist and Communist was an underlying and unifying reality: the Jews' historic prominence in the economy's distributive sector and as agents of economic change. Even so, the visibility of Jews in

commerce and the medical and legal professions was a symptom, not a cause, of a capitalist economic order with a meritocratic impetus and a permeable elite. The “Jewish Question” in modern Europe did not amount to anything more than a deceptively tangible avatar of the “social question.” Zionism as an ideology and political movement did not impinge upon the lives of Europeans as did other forces associated with Jews, such as capitalism, Bolshevism or cultural modernism.

Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in the Arab World

The function of Zionism in modern Arab anti-Semitism is radically different from that of its European counterpart. Simply put, whereas European anti-Semities regarded Zionism as a manifestation of Judaism, in the Middle East Jews and Judaism have, for the past century or more, been defined in terms of Zionism. We may take as a starting point the argument made in 1978 by Yehoshafat Harkabi, an Israeli scholar of the modern Arab world and Israeli security policy, that Arab anti-Semitism was the product of a specific political conflict—the century-long struggle with the Zionist movement, the *Yishuv* (pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) and the State of Israel—as opposed to the Islamic religious tradition as such or a fundamental inability of Islamic lands to tolerate Jews in their midst.²⁶ In an earlier work, Harkabi had documented at considerable length the extent of Judeophobic fantasy in the Arab world, and he made no effort now to deny or belittle the findings from his previous research.²⁷ But Harkabi came to question the value of cataloguing hostile statements about Israel or Jews without taking into account the historical circumstances in which they emerged or noting, as one could see during the era of the Camp David peace accords, that the same government directives that stoked anti-Semitic rhetoric could also staunch it, and that Arab attitudes towards Israel were shaped as much by specific Israeli policies and actions as they were by inherited, pervasive anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Harkabi’s argument, and my own here, are not to be confused with that of post-1948 Arab propagandists who have presented the history of the Jews in the lands of Islam as uniformly stable and prosperous, blessed by Islam’s enlightened and tolerant attitude towards its protected minorities, an attitude overturned solely by the injustices and cruelties against Arabs perpetrated by the State of Israel.²⁸ Obviously, the fate of Jews in *dar al-Islam* has been often an unhappy one, molded in part by the Judeophobic motifs that are imbedded in Islam’s foundational texts. In addition to the Koran’s many polemical comments about Jews and its accounts of Jewish treachery against Muhammad, a traditional biography of Muhammad attributes his death to poisoning by a Jewish woman, and an equally venerable historical text claims that Shi’ism, which sundered Islamic unity, was instigated by a Yemenite Jew.²⁹ Such texts, however, mean little when not considered in the context of medieval Jewish life in the lands of Islam, where despite constant discrimination the Jews lived in greater security, and were far less often the subject of chimeric fantasy, than in Europe, where persecutions and expulsions of Jews often followed accusations of ritual murder, desecration of the sacred host and

consorting with the Devil. As Mark Cohen has argued convincingly in his comparative history of Jewish life in medieval Christendom and *dar al-Islam*, in the latter acts of expulsion and forced conversion were highly exceptional.³⁰ Today, many critics of Muslim anti-Semitism place great stock in Moses Maimonides' celebrated *Letter to the Jews of Yemen* (1172), in which the renowned scholar claimed that the lot of Jews had been far worse under Muslim than under Christian rule. Yet this was a *cri de coeur* issued in a time of extreme, and atypical, persecution.

In the nineteenth century, notions of a Jewish international political and financial conspiracy were exported to the Middle East, largely via French and Francophone Christian clerics. Intriguingly, however, during the late Ottoman era Arab opposition to Zionism was not necessarily anti-Semitic. Palestinian Arabs expressed rational fears of displacement from a land in which they had long been resident, and Ottoman officials worried about the creation in the empire of a new minority problem akin to that presented by the Armenians.³¹ Intellectuals in Egypt and Syria conceived of Jews in complex ways, combining a realistic assessment of the Zionist movement's accomplishments with an exaggerated belief in Jewish power. For example, the *fin-de-siècle* Muslim reformer Rashid Ridha, who followed the Dreyfus Affair carefully and denounced anti-Semitism in print, wrote in 1899 that Muslims and Arabs would be wise to emulate Jewish solidarity, which had allowed them to preserve their language and culture despite many centuries of dispersion. Moreover, the Jews deserved praise for having adopted scientific knowledge and accumulated great wealth. The Jews, wrote Ridha, "lack nothing but sovereign power in order to become the greatest nation on the face of the earth, an objective they pursue in a normal manner. One Jew [Herzl] is now more respected than an Oriental monarch [Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid.]"³² There are obvious shades of hostility and exaggeration in Ridha's image of Jews as comprising a unified, wealthy and powerful collective, but his concern was the reality presented by the immigration of tens of thousands of Jews into Palestine, not, as in the case of European anti-Semitism, broad social transformations in which Jews played no significant causal role.

The secular Arab nationalist Najib Azuri, writing in 1905 in his classic work *Le Reveil de la nation arabe*, described Jews as a people engaged in a concerted drive to establish a state in what they perceived to be their homeland. "On the final outcome of this struggle," Azuri noted darkly (and, one hopes, not presciently), "between these two peoples, representing two opposing principles, will depend the destiny of the entire world."³³ Azuri's casual reference to Jews as a people points out an interesting distinction between early-twentieth-century Arab anti-Zionism, on the one hand, and both European anti-Semitism and later forms of Arab anti-Zionism, on the other. It was a staple of European anti-Semitism that Judaism comprised both a nation and a religion. Unlike European anti-Semitism, which imagined Jews to constitute an unassimilable and noxious nation, defying the quid pro quo of assimilation for emancipation, in the decades after Azuri, Arab propaganda had to develop an opposite argument that the Jews did not constitute even a retrograde nation, for to admit as much might open the way to accepting the legitimacy of the principles of Zionism.

In the twentieth-century Arab world, the interlacing of anti-Semitic motifs with opposition to Zionism occurred in a direct response to increased Jewish immigration to Palestine. It is no coincidence that the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* first appeared in Arabic in 1925, during the fourth, and largest yet, wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine. (The translation, from the French, was the work of a Catholic priest, Antoine Yamin, in Egypt.) The following year, an article in a periodical of the Jerusalem Latin Patriarchate announced the presence of the Arabic translation of the *Protocols* and urged the faithful to read them in order to understand what the Zionists had in store for Palestine. During the disturbances of the years 1928–29, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, publicized portions of the *Protocols* in connection with alleged Jewish plots to conquer the Temple Mount. Thus although the translation was done by a Christian cleric, infused with European anti-Semitic sensibilities, the text was immediately introduced into the context of the new and unique political conflict between Arabs and Jews for control over Palestine.³⁴

To be sure, during the interwar period Arab anti-Semitism was nourished by sources outside of Palestine. The rapid social mobility and prominence of Jews in Middle Eastern lands under colonial rule, and the economic and administrative links between Jews and colonial regimes, instilled a powerful anti-Semitic element into Arab nationalism, for which Jews served as metonymic representations of the West. In some instances, as in Iraq during the Second World War, German political and intellectual influences catalyzed pro-Nazi nationalist movements that imbibed racial anti-Semitism from its most potent source. A ruthless dedication to creating a culturally homogenous Arab nation led in Iraq to the massacre of thousands of Assyrian Christians in 1933 and of some 400 Jews during the *Farhoud* of 1941.³⁵ During the 1930s and 1940s, Middle Eastern anti-Semitism was strengthened further by the increasing popularity of socialism and communism among Arab intellectuals. Jews were defined by the Arab left as in league with their fascist persecutors, while royalists and fascist sympathizers leapt to wild conclusions from the disproportionate involvement of Jews in the communist parties in Egypt and Iraq. The important common element behind these contradictory expressions of Arab anti-Semitism during the interwar period was the adoption of common European views of the Jew as universal solvent, the destroyer of social order and bringer of chaos, housed in both the left and right ends of the political and economic spectrum. Arab anti-Semitism even adopted European notions of preternatural Jewish sexual powers. The secular and socialist-inspired youth so visible among the Zionist immigrants prompted Arab accusations that Jews were sexually promiscuous as well as carriers of Bolshevism—indeed, the Arab word for “communist” was *ibahi*, “permissive.”³⁶

Nonetheless, up to 1948 Arab anti-Semitism did not routinely function, as it did in Europe, as a totally unbounded discourse, attributing every ill of modern humanity to Jewish influence. And within Palestine itself, anti-Semitism grew directly out of conflict with the Zionist movement and its gradual, yet purposeful settlement of the country. The dominant tone was set as early as 1920, when in a play entitled *The Ruin of Palestine*, performed in Nablus, the comely daughter of a Jewish

tavern keeper seduces two wealthy Arabs and coaxes out of them their money and even the deeds to their properties, leaving the Arabs with no resource other than suicide, before which they wail “the country is ruined, the Jews have robbed us of our land and honor!”³⁷

Our focus thus far on the period before 1948 sharpens our perception of the novel qualities of Arab anti-Semitic discourse generated since the creation of the State of Israel. As opposed to traditional Muslim Judeophobia, post-1948 Arab anti-Semitism featured a transition from a view of the Jew as weak and degraded to a belief in Jewish global power. Traditional Islam scorned the Jew; post-1948 Arab anti-Semitism has blended contempt with fear. The fear stems from the apparent inability of Arabs to stop what has seemed to them to be a gradual, yet carefully planned and executed, Jewish takeover of Palestine, a land whose sanctity and significance have grown in the face of what appears to be a repetition of the Crusades, a European assault against the heartland of the Islamic world. The growth of a secular Arab nationalism, uniting Christians and Muslims in a common battle against Western colonialism, has expanded the purview of this alleged new crusade from a Muslim holy land to the Middle East as a whole. Older forms of contempt for Jews have, in recent decades, taken the form of the widespread view that, humiliating though it was to be subjugated by Christian Europe, it has been all the more galling to witness Palestine falling under the rule of Jews.

Indeed, the trope of assaulted Arab dignity is perhaps the most common theme in contemporary Arab anti-Semitism. Western pundits are wont to attribute this discourse to an atavistic shame-culture, in which codes of personal honor, particularly male honor, bind a rigid socio-religious hierarchy that privileges status over achievement and resists the formation of a liberal, inclusive, egalitarian and democratic Western-style civil society. It is not my brief to determine whether such views are accurate or whether they are the product of facile Orientalist fantasies. What is clear, however, is that the discourse on dignity in the Middle East stems primarily from a sense of overwhelming helplessness rather than from merely wounded pride. However much the Arab powers may have bickered over the fate of Palestine during the 1940s, the loss of Palestine to a Jewish state was seen as the defining catastrophic event of the era, or, as Constantine Zurayq described it in 1956, *al-naqba* (the disaster), a term that gained universal currency in decades to come:

The defeat of the Arabs in Palestine is no simple setback or light, passing evil. It is a disaster in every sense of the word and one of the harshest trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been afflicted throughout their long history—a history marked by numerous trials and tribulations.³⁸

Regardless of how one apportions responsibility for *al-naqba*, the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the ensuing occupation of those territories and the steady settlement of Jews therein, all of these phenomena are historical realities, as is Israel’s close relationship—particularly since 1967—with the United States, which is widely seen in the Middle East as the last remaining great colonial power. There is an

immeasurable gap between this scenario and that of modern Europe, where Jews as a collective wielded no power, conquered no land, expelled no family from its home.

There are strains of post-1948 Arab anti-Semitism that absorbed the Manichean qualities of Nazism, elevating the Jew into a global, even cosmic, evil, which must be annihilated, not only within Palestine but wherever he may be found. Such viewpoints are espoused vigorously by Muslim fundamentalists in many lands. They trace their intellectual pedigree to Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual father of the Muslim Brotherhood, who, while in Egyptian prisons during the 1950s, embroidered a European-style anti-Semitism into his massive commentary on the Koran. Qutb's anti-Semitism was ontological, perceiving Jews as incorrigibly evil and associated with all the world's ills, including capitalism, communism, atheism, materialism and modernism.³⁹ During the 1960s, Qutb, like fundamentalist leaders elsewhere in the Middle East, devoted most of his effort to toppling secular Arab leaders. Developments over a period of fifteen years—the 1967 war, the Sadat peace initiative, the Iranian Revolution, and Israel's invasion of Lebanon—transformed Muslim fundamentalism, causing anti-Zionism, according to Emmanuel Sivan, to “take pride of place, presented as the modern-day incarnation of the authentically Islamic hostility to the Jews.”⁴⁰

Nonetheless, the older, Palestinocentric streak in Arab anti-Semitism lives on in our own day, as in the 2002 Egyptian television series *Horseman without a Horse*, which was based in part on the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, but in which the Jewish conspiracy to control the world was replaced by a specific plot to take control of Palestine. Moreover, it is significant that the *Protocols* come in and out of fashion in Egypt; they were popular under Nasser, but fell out of circulation in the wake of Camp David, only to return after the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords. Arab anti-Semitism in any form is repugnant, but those forms that wax and wane in response to developments in Arab-Israeli relations are qualitatively different from the Manicheanism of extremist Muslim fundamentalists who, no less than the Nazis, imagine Jews as literally the handmaids of Satan and call for their eradication from the face of the globe. It is essential to draw a clear distinction between these two different forms of anti-Semitism, one of which may be malleable, subject to change in a dynamic and constructive political environment, while the other kind is incurable and must be confronted with unequivocal condemnation, isolation and, when necessary, forceful suppression.

Conclusion

This article's comparative framework will not please those who see European and Arab anti-Semitism as of a piece and who associate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism *tout court*. Some of my critics have responded with a comparison of their own, claiming that Jews in modern times have featured an exaggerated, perhaps unique capacity for self-criticism, and that this practice has led Jews, particularly Jewish intellectuals, whether in nineteenth-century Germany or in early-twenty-first-century North America and Israel, to internalize anti-Semitic assaults against them and to labor in

vain to ingratiate themselves with their persecutors. The frequently cited example of nineteenth-century German Jews relates a pathetic tale of individuals who responded to anti-Semitic accusations of Jewish vulgarity and parasitism by encouraging circumspect public behavior, the utmost probity in business affairs and the promotion of reputable, honorable occupations in crafts among poor Jewish youth. Of course, nothing German Jews did could possibly mitigate anti-Semitism, let alone assuage the genocidal fury of the Nazis. Similarly, argue many staunch supporters of Israel today, leftist Israelis and their counterparts in the Jewish diaspora are urging that Israel make massive, and ultimately self-destructive, territorial and political sacrifices in an illusory pursuit of peace. According to this pessimistic worldview, for most Arabs peace can only come in the wake of Israel's destruction, either spectacularly, by force, or gradually, through its transformation into a binational state, whose Jewish component would over time be overwhelmed by a rapidly growing Arab population, and whose Jewish character would accordingly fade away.

I respond to this objection by noting that Israel, unlike the Jewish global conspiracy of the European anti-Semitic imagination, does exist. Precisely because Arab anti-Semitism's fantasies are far more thoroughly grounded in reality than are those of their European predecessors, a necessary, although admittedly insufficient, precondition for deconstructing those fantasies will be a radical transformation of Israel's borders and policies towards Arabs both within and outside of the state. As Yehoshafat Harkabi wrote in the wake of the Camp David summit, "It is not the change of images . . . which will lead to peace, but peace which will lead to the change of images."⁴¹ Unlike the decline of anti-Semitism in post-1945 Europe, which was not the work of Jews but rather the result of the crimes and guilt of European society as a whole, in the Middle East Jews are obliged to make fateful political decisions in the hopes that such decisions will stimulate equally constructive action on the part of Israel's neighbors and the Palestinians under her control, that these multilateral actions will in fact lead to peace, and that peace will lead to a change of Arab images of Jews. This time around, anti-Semitism grows out of a political conflict in which Jews are empowered actors, not figments of the imagination. For this reason, although the chances for accommodation between Israel and the Arab world may appear slim, conditions are vastly more favorable than they were in pre-World War II Europe, not simply because the Jewish state possesses military power, but also because it has the capacity to take actions that may weaken the *raison d'être* of Arab anti-Semitism.

Notes

- [1] Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 9–10.
- [2] Handler, *An Early Blueprint for Zionism*, 42–51.
- [3] *Ibid.*, 152.
- [4] "Un Congrès israélite," *La Libre Parole*, 17 August 1897.
- [5] "Le Sionisme et la haute banque," *La Libre Parole*, 4 September 1897.

- [6] “Le Congrès sioniste,” *La Libre Parole*, 20 August 1907.
- [7] “L’Agonie du sionisme,” *La Libre Parole*, 11 September 1913.
- [8] “Le Congrès sioniste: Nouvelle orientation,” *La Libre Parole*, 31 August 1913; Busi, “Anti-Semites on Zionism,” 18–27.
- [9] Bernanos, *La Grande Peur des bien-pensants*.
- [10] André Lavagne, cited in Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 315. Compare the treatment of Vichy’s flirtation with Zionism on 310–15 with Francis Nicosia’s discussion of changes in Nazi policy towards Zionism over the years 1937–40 in his *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*, chaps. 7–9.
- [11] “Intorno alla Questione del Sionismo,” *La Civiltà Cattolica*, 2 April 1938, a. 89, v. II, quad. 2107, 76.
- [12] Biagini, *Mussolini e il sionismo*, 14, 23–24, 49–52, 63, 72, 78, 122, 128, 137.
- [13] Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr*, 88.
- [14] Dühring, *Die Judenfrage als Frage der Rassenschädlichkeit*, 122–23.
- [15] *Ibid.*, 127–78.
- [16] I have compared the 1886, 1892, 1907 and 1910 editions of the work, which was published at first by the author in Leipzig, but which as of 1907, if not earlier, was published by the Hanseatischer Druck- und Verlags-Anstalt in Hamburg.
- [17] Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage*, 170. Similarly, Fritsch’s book *The Riddle of the Jew’s Success*, published in many editions during the 1920s, does not even raise the issue of Zionism in its final chapter about World War I and Jewish control over wartime finance.
- [18] Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, 1:477n.
- [19] For Rosenberg’s and Hitler’s views on Zionism, see Nicosia, *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*, 20–8; and Wistrich, *Hitler’s Apocalypse*, 154–63 (citation from *Mein Kampf* on 155).
- [20] Cited by Marvin Kurz, “Ernst Zundel Is More Dangerous Than You Realize,” *The Globe and Mail*, 26 February 2003, A15.
- [21] On the history of the *Protocols*, see Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide*; Segel, *A Lie and a Libel*; and Bronner, *A Rumor about the Jews*.
- [22] Bronner, *A Rumor about the Jews*, 92.
- [23] Thanks to Steven Zipperstein for this observation.
- [24] Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide*, 108. See also Segel, *A Lie and a Libel*, 71–79.
- [25] See the excerpts in Levy, ed., *Antisemitism in the Modern World*, 169–77.
- [26] Harkabi, “On Arab Antisemitism Once More,” 227–40. The Hebrew edition of the book in which this article appeared, based on a 1978 conference, was published in 1980.
- [27] The book *Arab Attitudes To Israel*, published in English in 1971, first appeared in Hebrew in 1967.
- [28] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, 3–14.
- [29] Nettler, “Islamic Archetypes of the Jews,” 63–73.
- [30] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, 167.
- [31] Porath, “Anti-Zionist and Anti-Jewish Ideology,” 217–26.
- [32] Be’eri, “The Jewish-Arab Conflict during the Herzl Years,” 13.
- [33] Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*, 75, 77–78 (quote on 78).
- [34] Rubinstein, ““Ha-protokolim shel ziknei tziyon” ba-sikhsukh ha-aravi-yehudi,” 37–42.
- [35] Simon, *Iraq between the Two World Wars*.
- [36] Porath, “Anti-Zionist and Anti-Jewish Ideology,” 223.
- [37] Muslih, *Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*, 169.
- [38] Zurayk, *The Meaning of the Disaster*, 2.
- [39] Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, 85–6.
- [40] Sivan, “Islamic Fundamentalism, Antisemitism, and Anti-Zionism,” 82.
- [41] Harkabi, “On Arab Antisemitism Once More,” 238.

References

- Be'eri, Eliezer. "The Jewish-Arab Conflict during the Herzl Years." *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 41 (1987): 3–18.
- Berman, Paul. *Terror and Liberalism*. New York: Norton, 2003.
- Bernanos, Georges. *La Grande Peur des bien-pensants, Edouard Drumont*. Paris: B. Grasset, 1931.
- Biagini, Furio. *Mussolini e il sionismo*. Milan: M & B, 1998.
- Bronner, Stephen Erich. *A Rumor about the Jews: Reflections on Antisemitism and the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Busi, Frederick. "Anti-Semites on Zionism." *Midstream* (February 1979): 18–27.
- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1968.
- Cohen, Mark. *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Cohn, Norman. *Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
- Dühring, Eugen. *Die Judenfrage als Frage der Rassenschädlichkeit für Existenz, Sitte und Cultur der Völker*. 4th ed. Berlin: H. Reuther, 1892.
- . *Die Judenfrage als Frage des Rassencharakters und seiner Schädlichkeiten für Existenz und Kultur der Völker*. 6th ed. Leipzig: O.R. Reiland, 1930.
- Fritsch, Theodor. *Handbuch der Judenfrage*. 36th ed., 146–155M. Leipzig: Hammer-Verlag, 1934.
- Handler, Andrew. *An Early Blueprint for Zionism: Gyöző Istóczy's Political Antisemitism*. East European Monographs. Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- Harkabi, Yehoshafat. "On Arab Antisemitism Once More." In *Antisemitism through the Ages*, edited by Shmuel Almog. Oxford: Pergamon, 1988.
- Herzl, Theodor. *Der Judenstaat*. 8th ed. Berlin: Jüdisches Verlag, 1920.
- Levy, Richard S., ed. *Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts*. Lexington, MA: T.C. Heath, 1991.
- Marrus, Michael, and Robert O. Paxton. *Vichy France and the Jews*. New York: Schocken, 1981.
- Muslih, Muhammad Y. *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Nettler, Ron. "Islamic Archetypes of the Jews: Then and Now." In *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Modern World*, edited by Robert Wistrich. London: Macmillan, 1990.
- Nicosia, Francis. *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.
- Porath, Yehoshua. "Anti-Zionist and Anti-Jewish Ideology in the Arab Nationalist Movement in Palestine." In *Antisemitism through the Ages*, edited by Shmuel Almog. Oxford: Pergamon, 1988.
- Rubinstein, Elyakim. "'Ha-protokolim shel ziknei tziyon' ba-sikhsukh ha-aravi-yehudi be-eretz yisra'el bi-shnot ha-esrim." (The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the Arab–Jewish Conflict in the Land of Israel in the 1920s). *Ha-Mizrah he-Hadash* 26 (1977): 37–42.
- Segel, Benjamin. *A Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
- Simon, Reeva Spector. *Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*. 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. "Islamic Fundamentalism, Antisemitism, and Anti-Zionism." In *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Modern World*, edited by Robert Wistrich. London: Macmillan, 1990.
- Wistrich, Robert. *Hitler's Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985.
- Zimmermann, Moshe. *Wilhelm Marr: The Patriarch of Antisemitism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Zurayk, Constantine. *The Meaning of the Disaster*. Beirut: Khayat's College Book Co-operative, 1956.